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Distributing the wealth from the earth 
 
Javier Arellano-Yanguas  
Andres Mejía-Acosta  
 
Abstract 
This article explains different criteria and mechanisms for distributing Extractive 
Industries (EI) revenues between central and local governments across countries and 
territories. It reveals that institutional or systemic predictors of distribution are not 
enough to explain different shares of revenue sharing. The proportion of EI revenues 
effectively transferred to subnational governments is neither related to the level of fiscal 
decentralisation of the countries nor to their federal or unitary nature. We suggest that 
the relative strength of the subnational governments vis-a-vis the central government as 
well as the relative alignment of preferences between local and national governments 
have a significant impact on transferring EI-revenues. We conclude that administrative 
or fiscal decentralisation alone are not sufficient to ensure an effective distribution of 
natural resource revenues. Effective political decentralisation can reduce vertical 
asymmetries and ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth across all jurisdictions. 
 
1 Introduction 
The recent price and investment boom in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors has 
triggered widespread expectations for greater economic and social development, 
especially among developing countries. The potential success of a development strategy 
based on the extraction of non-renewable resources is largely dependent on the share of 
revenue captured by the state from the extractive sector, and the methods that 
governments adopt to use and distribute that revenue (Bebbington 2012). This paper 
acknowledges existing dilemmas around the extraction of revenue – through taxes and 
royalties – but focuses on the criteria used to allocate revenue from extractive industries 
(EI) to different levels of government.   
The choice of a mechanism to allocate extractive revenue is an inherently political 
process. The exploitation of natural resources has some specific features that tend to 
differentiate the criteria used to distribute this revenue from the general decentralising 
framework in each country. In the first place, minerals, oil and gas are frequently 
concentrated in specific territories; the people living there are likely to demand a share 
of the proceeds from the extraction to compensate for the use of their resources and the 
negative externalities associated with extraction. Secondly, minerals and hydrocarbons 
are non-renewable, which puts additional pressure on replacing the extracted resources 
with some investment in durable assets, giving tangible (e.g. physical infrastructure) or 
intangible (e.g. education) benefits. These features have led to greater decentralisation 
of EI-related revenue in recent years, but the methods and mechanisms adopted vary 
widely across countries. We find that distributive mechanisms do not necessarily follow 
existing lines of administrative or fiscal decentralisation but rather, are renegotiated 
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across existing political motivations and organisational capacity of the main 
stakeholders.  
This paper explores three questions: 
 How do central governments share (or distribute) the revenue from extractive 
industries with different levels of subnational government (vertical distribution)? 
 How do governments distribute EI revenue across similar jurisdictions, some of 
which are extractive but others not (horizontal distribution)? 
 To which extent do factors such as the structure of the state and other conventional 
political features determine the degree of decentralisation of EI revenues and the 
modality of distribution? 
In this paper we contend that variations in the horizontal and vertical distribution of 
revenues does not only depend on technical considerations for optimal distribution but 
also on the political motivations and coalitions to distribute EI revenues. We highlight 
the relative importance of the timing of reforms to the EI sector, the importance of 
federal vs. unitary states, and the relative bargaining power and alignment of 
subnational actors vis-à-vis the central government. We discuss some preliminary 
explanations and draw some policy implications. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the main features of existing methods, 
rules and practices for allocating resource revenues at subnational level. Section 3 
shows the variation in ten countries worldwide for which we have identified reliable and 
comparable data on the distribution of revenue. Finally, Section 4 discusses some of the 
salient political factors that influence the adoption of different revenue allocation 
policies. This section also summarises the key arguments and identifies knowledge gaps 
to better understand the linkage between allocation formulas and development outcomes 
at the local level. 
2. Methods for the distribution of resource revenue 
This section gives an overview of common criteria used to distribute EI-related revenue 
from central to subnational governments (vertical distribution), as well as commonly 
used methods to determine the distribution across subnational governments (horizontal 
distribution).  
Vertical distribution of EI revenues 
The key policy challenge for an effective vertical distribution of revenues is to balance 
the need to minimise fiscal volatility and financial liabilities while appeasing increased 
social demands coming from subnational governments. In short, EI revenues ignite the 
fiscal tensions between central, regional and local governments. Three criteria are 
commonly taken into consideration when deciding the distribution of EI revenues 
(Ahmad and Singh 2003): a) matching (administrative) responsibilities to the level of 
fiscal transfers; b) ensuring a political equilibrium between the centre and the periphery; 
and c) managing volatile revenues. 
a) Matching responsibilities  
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According to this criterion, the share of transfers (including EI-related transfers, all 
other fiscal transfers and locally raised taxes) should match the revenue needed by 
subnational governments to fund the public services they are responsible for (Schoeder 
and Smoke 2002). In practice, evaluating the ‘appropriate’ level of public services as 
well as the ‘matching revenue’ needed to fund them are difficult to assess and forecast; 
extractive territories may claim a greater entitlement to benefiting from EI-related 
revenues but the actual allocations are subject to political interpretation and intense 
bargaining.  
b) Political equilibrium between centre and periphery 
In the context of good governance reforms favouring decentralisation, the presence of 
the extractive sector has encouraged demands from subnational governments to manage 
part of the proceeds from EI. Frequently this has been formulated as a ‘right’ that has 
been enshrined in the constitutions of the countries (Ahmad and Mottu 2003; Ross 
2007). The literature suggests that pre-existing levels of fiscal and political 
decentralisation would further strengthen the role of opposition parties and subnational 
actors to demand greater decentralisation reforms, but conversely, when central 
governments have contained or delayed pressures for fiscal or political decentralisation, 
the overall level of decentralisation tends to remain weak (Falleti 2010) .  
c) Managing volatile revenues 
Given the unpredictable nature of commodity prices, revenue from extractive industries 
has the potential to induce fiscal volatility in national and subnational public finances 
(Ahmad and Singh 2003). To minimise the impact of revenue volatility, some have 
advocated a centralised management of EI revenue through a savings or stabilisation 
fund (Ahmad and Mottu 2003). This is done partly to accumulate savings at the central 
level, but also to protect subnational entities from the problems arising from handling 
revenue windfalls. If fiscal centralisation is not technically feasible or politically 
desirable, it is recommended to devolve more ‘stable’ revenue that is independent from 
international prices – such as royalties (when these are calculated based on gross 
production), licences and other fees. Finally, if volatile tax revenue is to be 
decentralised, mechanisms should be introduced to stabilise the flow of resources 
(Davis, Ossowski, Daniel and Barnett 2003). 
Each of these criteria reveal the unavoidable political nature of distributive debates and 
its consequences. The actual allocations show the tensions between objectively defined 
needs and local perceptions, between the national perspective and the demands of 
producing regions, between the moderation of technical proposals and the urge from 
radical decentralization that frequently accompany the discovery or mineral riches, 
between ideal political designs and the influence of pre-existing decentralization 
arrangements. The next section discusses additional allocation criteria fro distributing 
rents across producing and non producing districts.  
 
Horizontal distribution of revenue from EI 
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A key discussion around the allocation of EI revenue across different subnational 
jurisdictions focuses on whether to redistribute revenue solely to territories that host 
extractive activities, and whether the central government should reallocate revenue 
through discretionary or institutionalised rules, such as the adoption of a proportionality 
formula. The existing literature has identified three types of mechanisms: a) direct 
allocation from the central government, b) formula-based participation, and c) 
devolution. In practice, countries combine two or more criteria when adopting 
redistribution formulas. 
 
a) Allocation from the central government 
In this scenario, central governments seek to centralise the macroeconomic management 
of revenue to minimise the risk of uncontrolled subnational expenditure. Government 
finance is usually transferred on an annual basis for specific projects and development 
or regional investment funds. Governments could also distribute available revenue 
through competitive investment grants aimed at supporting specific types of projects. In 
principle, the adoption of competitive grant mechanisms by the central government has 
the potential to reinforce pre-existing economic inequalities and power asymmetries 
between subnational governments. Some territories with solid public finances may have 
greater expenditure capabilities or possess the technical ability to formulate and obtain 
additional resources through competitive grant schemes. In any case, these mechanisms 
of competitive allocation offer more transparent alternatives than allocating valuable 
resources through protracted or clandestine political negotiations which may intensify 
existing political divides. 
b) Formula-based participation  
Through this mechanism, subnational governments receive a pre-determined share of 
the revenue raised nationally. A formula set by law determines both the amount to be 
allocated and the obligation of the central government to transfer those resources to both 
producing and non-producing territories. The different needs and characteristics of each 
jurisdiction can be factored into the formula to compensate for pre-existing inequalities, 
the size of the population and, in some cases, the tax gap. The allocation formula can 
also reflect different variables on government performance, such as the fiscal effort of 
each territorial unit.  
While formulas can become more complex to reflect different dynamics, the ultimate 
challenge for policymakers is to ensure fairness and efficiency. Excessive complexity 
can trigger conflicts regarding interpretation of the formula, counteracting any marginal 
gain in terms of equity and efficiency. However, formula-based participation, even if 
well designed, can also have some drawbacks. It reduces the flexibility of the central 
government to manage the macroeconomic challenges associated with EIs, and does not 
take into consideration the geographical source of tax revenue. 
c) Devolution 
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Devolution involves the transfer of revenue, or a proportion of it, to the jurisdiction 
where the income has been generated.i In the case of revenue from EI, devolution makes 
the producing regions, and sometimes those that host some infrastructure for 
exploitation (mainly ports), the only recipients of transfers. This mechanism aims to 
compensate producing regions for negative externalities linked to extraction, and the 
need to adjust infrastructure and public services to the presence of mining and oil 
operations (Brosio 2003). However, the concentration of transfers to producing regions 
might generate three types of problems: a) inequality between producing and non-
producing regions; b) problems of revenue volatility in producing regions; and c) to 
discourage collection of local taxes and distort the allocation of resources at the local 
level because of the abundance of transfers. 
The implementation of devolution mechanisms requires identification of the 
jurisdictions that should be prioritised. The following two criteria are the most 
frequently used: a) the geographical origin of the revenue, and b) territories affected by 
negative externalities linked to extraction.ii The criterion of origin tries to compensate 
for the loss of natural capital (the mineral) by financial transfers to the governments of 
the territories where the extraction takes place. Such transfers should in principle help to 
develop other types of capital (human, physical, etc.) to enhance the developmental 
potential of those territories. Frequently, the strict application of this criterion leaves out 
neighbouring jurisdictions that are also affected by extraction. The criterion of negative 
externalities tries to solve this limitation. It takes into account environmental damage, 
but also the need to improve physical infrastructure (roads, the electrical grid, etc.) and 
to scale up public services in order to respond to the likely increase in population due to 
immigration from other regions of the country. 
This section discussed the extent to which political or technical criteria largely informs 
the distribution of EI revenues. The next section looks at comparative data from a set of 
ten resource rich countries to determine for example, whether countries with greater 
fiscal and administrative decentralisation are in fact more likely to distribute a larger 
share of EI revenues to subnational governments than formal unitary countries.  
3 Subnational transfers in comparative perspective 
A brief review of the comparative evidence available (see table 1) shows that existing 
methods for distributing EI revenues between central and subnational governments 
(vertical distribution), and across producing and non-producing regions (horizontal 
distribution) vary widely. The data, collected for ten resource-rich countries (oil and 
mining) where reliable and comparable information was located (Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and Peru) 
shows that allocations do not reflect the ‘pure types’ identified in the literature. Table 1 
summarises the distribution of EI-revenues between central, regional, state and local 
government levels according to the last reform in each country.iii This section highlights 
some patterns and regularities found in the distribution.  
Vertical distribution 
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Table 1 reports countries according to their degree of decentralisation of EI revenues. 
Decentralisation is a) low if all subnational governments receive less than 10 per cent of 
state EI revenue (Ecuador, Ghana and Papua New Guinea); b) medium if subnational 
governments receive between 10 per cent and 50 per cent of the EI revenue (Colombia, 
Indonesia and Mexico); and c) high if subnational governments receive more than 50 
per cent of the EI revenue accrued to the central government (Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and 
Nigeria). The table also provides information on the share of total EI revenue that is 
formally allocated to each tier of government.  
The first striking feature is that decentralisation of EI revenue is neither directly related 
to the formal territorial structure nor to the general level of decentralisation of the 
country. While there are federal countries like Brazil or Nigeria that effectively share a 
high proportion of EI revenues with regions, federal Mexico transfers less than 20 per 
cent of EI revenue. Conversely, some unitary countries such as Bolivia or Peru 
redistribute up to 55 per cent of their EI revenue to subnational units. There is no clear 
association between the allocation of EI revenues and the share of fiscal decentralisation 
in each country either. Figure 1 shows that subnational public expenditure as a share of 
total public expenditure is not associated with the decentralisation of EI revenues in six 
Latin American countries. Even though Peru and Ecuador have relatively low levels of 
fiscal decentralisation, the Peruvian state is highly decentralised when it comes to 
allocating EI revenues. A similar comparison happens between Brazil and Mexico, with 
Mexico favouring lower decentralisation of EI revenues despite having higher levels of 
fiscal decentralisation.  
 
Figure 1: Relation between fiscal decentralisation and decentralisation of EI-
revenues 
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*Average for years 2000-2007. Data from Ruiz Duran (2011) 
A second feature of vertical distribution is that subnational beneficiaries (regional, state 
and local level governments) vary widely as well. In federal states like Brazil, Nigeria 
and even Mexico, the bulk of allocated transfers go to state-level governments, probably 
because the central government spending is channelled through the existing fiscal 
decentralisation structure. In two of the three cases, we observe that revenues 
transferred to regional or state-level governments more than double the share of 
revenues allocated to local or municipal governments (45 per cent to 21 per cent in 
Brazil and 36 per cent per cent to 18 per cent in Nigeria). 
By contrast, in non-federal (or unitary) systems like Peru and Indonesia where 
decentralisation is a relatively new phenomena, local-level governments receive more 
than three times the share of EI revenues than state-level counterparts (43 per cent for 
municipalities compared to 12 per cent for regions in Peru, and 12 per cent compared to 
3 per cent in Indonesia). Bolivia initially had a more equitable distribution across the 
three tiers of government (37 per cent to the national government, 37 per cent to the 
regional government and 26 per cent to municipalities). After 2012, president Morales 
increased fiscal transfers in favour of local governments (in the form of cash transfer 
schemes managed by the central government) while reducing transfers to regions 
(prefecturas), most of which were governed by opposition parties. These changes 
confirm the political nature of decentralising EI revenues: ‘if confronted with the 
opportunity of need to decentralize, the national executive prefers to do it toward the 
local level, since mayors pose less of an electoral and financial threat than governors’ 
(Falleti 2010). 
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Horizontal distribution 
Table 1 also shows significant variation in the existing methods for distributing EI 
revenue to producing districts only or favouring a more equitable distribution across all 
territories including non-producing areas (horizontal distribution). Once again, the 
degree of decentralisation of EI revenues is not related to the type of beneficiaries. At 
high levels of decentralisation, countries like Bolivia would prioritise transfers to 
producing districts and allow some distribution to non-producing regions, whereas 
Nigeria would favour formula-based participation to benefit all subnational 
governments and restrict the funds going to producing states only (Kâ Diongue, Giraud 
and Renouard 2011). In contrast, Brazil and Peru have preferred formulas that devolve 
revenue back to the producing region or state and localities in producing regions. Yet 
the Brazilian government has sought to compensate non-producing regions by investing 
on essential infrastructure (ports, roads, pipelines and railways) to support extractive 
activities. Furthermore, the Brazilian Congress adopted in 2013 new legislation to 
redistribute oil revenue among all federal states, and is currently in the process of 
approving a law that allows the use of oil-related revenue in education sector 
expenditure. However, the three producing states (and original beneficiaries of the 
devolution mechanism) have stopped the law’s implementation through an appeal to the 
constitutional court (Fick 2013; Reuters 2013).  
In countries with a medium level of decentralisation of EI revenue, revenue tends to be 
distributed through a combination of devolution and formula-based mechanisms. 
Colombia has moved in a similar direction as Brazil – from a system that concentrated 
transfer of royalties on the producing regions, to a more equitable system where most of 
the royalties are distributed between all subnational jurisdictions. In Indonesia, oil-
related transfers go exclusively to the producing areas (provinces and districts), but 50 
per cent of the value of these transfers is discounted from the ordinary transfers that 
these provinces and districts should receive from the national government (Morgandi 
2008). More recently, a percentage of the EI revenue has been given to jurisdictions 
adjacent to the producing ones to compensate negative externalities linked to extraction. 
However, these criteria frequently generate grievances because negative externalities do 
not coincide with the boundaries of official jurisdictions. This opens the way for 
continuous demands from populations who feel excluded from fiscal distribution. 
Mexico is the only country to distribute EI revenue proportionally across the entire 
country through an allocation formula.  
In countries with low levels of EI decentralisation (Ecuador, Ghana and Papua New 
Guinea), most EI transfers tend to favour producing regions only. In Ecuador, 
subnational governments (provinces and municipalities) have benefited from fiscal 
decentralisation since the mid-1990s, but this devolution did not include the specific 
transfer of EI revenues. With the advent of the commodities boom after 2004, the 
government further centralised the allocation of EI revenues while reducing the fiscal 
and political leverage of the producing regions as well. 
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The review of the different criteria followed by the countries in our sample provides 
some preliminary evidence than needs to be further tested. The data reported in figure 1 
confirms that the general degree of fiscal decentralisation of the country matters. 
Countries with higher levels of decentralisation (Brazil and Mexico) tend to prioritise a 
type of redistribution that benefits all the regions across the country. At the opposite 
extreme, countries with a weak decentralisation (Peru and Ecuador) concentrate the 
transfers on the producing jurisdictions. Colombia and Bolivia, which have moderate 
levels of fiscal decentralisation, combine devolution to the producing regions with 
formula based distribution to all the territories. The argument holds, in general terms, 
for the four non Latin-American countries included in our sample. The evidence also 
suggests that high levels of fiscal decentralisation provide subnational governments 
across the country with greater bargaining power to demand the distribution of EI-
revenues more broadly. 
 
4. Discussion and some implications for policy reforms 
This paper has offered a brief overview of existing mechanisms for distributing EI 
revenues and the empirical variation of mechanisms across cases and territories. The 
review illustrates how little is known about the institutions and political dynamics of 
transferring EI revenues from central to subnational governments. There are several 
questions that need to be addressed before making recommendations to citizens, 
national policymakers and international donors about the ‘optimal’ distribution 
mechanisms. In this section, we discuss these challenges, interpret the available 
evidence and discuss alternative approaches to understand how to maximise the impact 
of EI revenues at the subnational level.  
1. Who benefits from EI revenues? We find significant variation regarding the 
beneficiaries of natural resource revenues, particularly depending on whether these 
revenues benefit producing regions and localities alone or whether they are further 
distributed to benefit non-producing jurisdictions as well.  
a. We do not find a consistent pattern to distribute EI revenues to solely target 
producing districts or more equitably across all districts. The federal estates 
in the sample (Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico) tend to favour a more equitable 
distribution than non-federal countries. Governments in unitary settings have 
sought to recentralise the management of EI revenues in order to ensure a 
more equitable distribution of EI revenues. In cases like Ecuador, Colombia 
and federal Brazil, the government has invested considerable resources to 
develop a national infrastructure, which benefits both producing and non-
producing regions. However, we have suggested that greater centralisation of 
EI revenues in non-federal countries may allow the executive considerable 
discretionality to benefit partisan allies or undermine the opposition in 
producing and non-producing regions. 
b. One possibility to be further explored is that countries will favour more 
equitable distribution of EI revenues when subnational governments also 
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take part (directly or indirectly) in the national governing coalition. In 
principle, if local elites have strong connections with central governments, 
they may be more able to gain access to fiscal resources, projects, 
discretionary transfers and policy influence. This is the case of Bolivia and 
Colombia. In Bolivia, president Evo Morales would have preferred to 
recentralise revenues after the 2005 reforms but had to compromise a fairer 
and more proportional distribution of revenues with the opposition governors 
and mayors (especially in three hydrocarbon-rich regions).  
c. However, a stronger alignment between central and subnational governments 
may also mean greater dependency on the executive and less autonomy to 
pursue the regions’ own development strategies. 
 
2. Fiscal decentralisation and extractive revenues. Much of the debate around the 
allocation of EI revenues fails to take into account the relative weight of the 
extractives sector in the overall fiscal decentralisation and budgetary management. 
An initial comparison suggests that there is no relation between the share of EI 
revenues and the share of government revenues (as percentage of GDP) transferred 
from central to subnational governments. In some countries like Ecuador or Mexico, 
the share of fiscal transfers tends to be greater than the share of EI transfers, whereas 
in Bolivia, Peru, Brazil or Colombia is the opposite, there is greater decentralisation 
of EI revenues.  
a. One potential explanation is the timing of reforms: if fiscal reforms precede 
the distribution of EI revenues, the share of subnational government 
spending appears to be higher than the share of EI transfers, other things 
being equal. This is the case of Ecuador, which adopted fiscal 
decentralisation in 1997 long after the devolution of EI revenues. 
Conversely, EI transfers are likely to be higher in a context of fiscal 
decentralisation if they were bargained during a commodities boom as in the 
case of Brazil, Peru and Bolivia. In cases like Peru and Bolivia, 
redistribution reforms adopted after 2000 took place in the context of 
strengthening democratisation and fiscal decentralisation reforms, which 
reinforced the strength of local actors to organise electorally, promote social 
mobilisations and disrupt the workings of extractive activities (Arellano-
Yanguas 2012; Crabtree and Chaplin 2013).  
b. Governments may also be more reluctant to share extractive revenues when 
these represent a significant part of total government spending. In practice, 
there are multiple ways in which EI revenues could be managed by the 
central government to fund capital or current investments without 
channelling through fiscal decentralisation formulas. Ecuador, Colombia and 
to a lesser extent Bolivia are cases where central governments have 
recentralised the distribution of EI revenues while gaining greater political 
leverage over the management of these allocations. 
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c. It remains an empirical question the extent to which greater recentralisation 
of EI revenues in the hands of the executive may offer greater opportunities 
for discretionary use of EI revenues in the form of off-budgetary 
expenditures for example. As a direct policy implication, it is relevant to 
reinvigorate budget transparency debates for the management of EI 
revenues, to ensure that citizens, parliaments and independent audit 
institutions are able to monitor and oversee the transparent execution of 
these resources.  
 
3. Federalism and extractive revenues. This essay finds no evidence of a direct 
relationship between the formal organisation of the territory (into a federal or 
unitary administration) and the magnitude of transfers to subnational governments.  
The common expectation is that autonomous subnational units in a federal state 
would have greater leverage to extract and manage taxation and non-tax revenues, 
compared to the more limited autonomy (or greater dependency) of subnational 
governments on the central government in a unitary state. The cases analysed 
suggest that a federal structure alone does not guarantee greater availability of EI 
revenues at the subnational level. For example, there are federal cases like Mexico, 
which devolve a much lower percentage of EI revenues to local and state 
governments than unitary states like Bolivia and Peru.  
a. One potential explanation is that effective transfers of EI revenues take place 
when local governments increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the central 
government, either through winning local elections, by organising social 
mobilisation or by making coalitions with the extractives sector. Some of 
these factors are present in the cases of Peru and Bolivia. In Colombia and 
Ecuador, governments were able to recentralise the management of EI 
revenues given the weak and limited ability of subnational governments to 
oppose the government or present an organised movement during the decade 
of reforms (Rudas Lleras and Espitia Zamora 2013). 
b. There also is considerable variation in the way EI revenues are distributed to 
local governments. Most but not all federal states tend to privilege 
allocations to state or regional governments (Brazil and Nigeria) whereas 
unitary states tend to benefit local or municipal governments. A potential 
explanation is that central governments in unitary states would prefer to 
target resources to municipal governments in order to enhance their political 
leverage over fragmented governments (as in the case of Indonesia and 
Peru), whereas in federal structures, central governments are less able to re-
centralise EI revenues or influence the policy (and political) preferences of 
subnational governments.  
c. Based on the available evidence, we cannot extract a direct association 
between the territorial organisation and the allocation of revenues, but we 
would make the case that federal states would be better equipped to manage 
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the transfer of EI revenues to subnational governments in a more efficient 
and accountable manner (Ahmad and Mottu 2003). 
5. Conclusion 
The growing importance of the extractive sector in the developmental strategy of many 
poor and middle-income countries raises the question of the distribution of EI revenues 
among levels of government and across different jurisdictions in a given level. Theory 
provides clear guidance for designing such redistributive policies. Regarding vertical 
distribution, the theory says that each level of government should benefit from EI 
revenues in proportion to their functional responsibilities and that subnational 
governments’ finances should not rely on volatile revenue. Regarding horizontal 
distribution, technical criteria highlight the importance of compensating to the 
producing jurisdictions for the negative externalities linked to extraction without 
generating territorial unbalances or grievances due to an extremely unequal distribution 
of revenues. Our review of redistributive policies in ten resource-rich countries shows 
that institutional considerations are not sufficient to determine actual revenue sharing. 
The variety of criteria for the distribution of EI-revenues points out to political factors 
as the main drivers of those policies. In this article we have attempted a first cut at 
understanding what those political factors might be. The data do not show clear 
patterns. Neither the level of fiscal decentralisation nor the federal or unitary nature of 
the state seems to determine the proportion of EI-revenues transferred to subnational 
governments. In contrast, the historical context in which EI-related transfers are 
negotiated and the relative strength of the subnational governments vis a vis the central 
government are the factors that seem to influence the level of EI-revenues transfers.  
We find that the way in which the decentralised revenues are distributed between 
producing and non-producing territories also varies greatly in our sample countries. 
Here the level of fiscal decentralisation does seem to matter. Higher levels of fiscal 
decentralisation in the country are correlated with a more equal distribution across all 
the regions of the country. This suggests that differences in bargaining power of sub-
national governments due to previous fiscal decentralisation might be the explanation. 
Decentralisation empowers all subnational governments and decreases the asymmetry in 
negotiating power between non-producing regions and producing jurisdictions (that 
have the capacity to disrupt the activity of the extractive companies). Thus the data 
presented in this article suggest that distributional policies are best explained by 
differences of bargaining power between the central and the subnational governments 
and across subnational jurisdictions. This conclusion calls for better understandings of 
the nature of such bargaining power in specific contexts—a task that we have started in 
a separate paper. (Arellano-Yanguas and Mejía-Acosta 2014) Despite well developed 
theoretical rationale for sharing of revenues from extractive industries, how it is 
operationalised seems to rest ultimately on politics; thus the political relations between 
national and subnational governments seem critical in shaping revenue policies.  
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Table 1  Models of decentralisation of EI revenue in selected countries* 
 Bolivia (oil and gas) 
Brazil** 
(oil and gas) 
Peru 
(mining and 
gas) 
Nigeria 
(oil) 
Colombia 
(oil since 
2011) 
Mexico 
(oil) 
Indonesia 
(oil) 
Ecuador 
(oil) 
Ghana 
(mining) 
Papua New 
Guinea 
(oil and gas) 
Type of revenue transferred Royalties and IDH 
Royalties and 
participation 
Royalties and 
income taxes 
Total oil 
revenue Royalties 
Total oil 
revenue 
Total oil 
revenue 
Total oil 
revenue Royalties Royalties 
Date of the last reform 2007 1989 2004 1999 2011 1978 2004 2010 1992-1999 1998 
Degree of decentralisation High High High High Medium Medium Medium Low Low Low 
V
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
National government 
and centralised funds 37% 31% 45% 46% 52% 83% 85% 98% 91% 93% 
Regional/state 
governments 37% 45% 12% 36% 48% 
17% 3% 1% 5% 3% 
Local governments 26% 21% 43% 18%  12% 1% 2% 2% 
Private landlords  3%       2% 2% 
H
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
D
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
Producing region/state 28% 45% 12% 13% 
10% 
 3% 1% 5% 3% 
Producing localities 13% 17% 5%   6% 1% 2% 2% 
Localities in producing 
regions  4% 38%    6%    
Total devolution 41% 66% 55% 13% 10%  15% 2% 7% 5% 
F
o
r
m
u
l
a
-
b
a
s
e
d
 Region/state 9%   23% 
38% 
17%     
Localities 13%   18%      
Total formula-based 22%   41% 38% 17%     
*   Some data on percentages reflects quantities for specific years.  
** In March 2013 the Brazilian parliament approved a reform to distribute oil royalties more evenly across the country; the law is currently under revision by the Constitutional Court.  
Sources: Agustina, Ahmad, Nugrohoand Siagian (2012); Banful (2011); Departamento Nacional de Planeación-Colombia (2012); Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (2005); Iledare 
and Suberu (2012); Morgandi (2008)  
 

  1
 
i This mechanism is also known as ‘derivation’ according to Ehtisham Ahmad and Eric Mottu (2003) but we refer to 
‘devolution’ in this paper. 
ii These territories are usually identified with those hosting infrastructure needed for the exploitation or transportation of 
minerals.  
iii The data does not represent actual shares but EI revenue entitlements according to existing legislation and tends to 
underestimate the participation of central government. There are other types of EI revenues such as margins of profit 
from state-owned oil and mining companies that are managed by the national government and may be distributed to 
subnational governments in the form of discretional transfers. 
                                                 
